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PREFACE
Rebecca Smith's study reviews the major features of the post-World
War II building boom, the Twin Cities component of that boom, and the effects
of that era in selected Twin Cities neighborhoods. Her cool and carefully
documented analysis is a refreshing alternative to the often hysterical ap-
praisals and apocalyptic conclusions about suburban America of the past
thirty years.
It has never been clear to me why the postwar suburbanization epoch,
which burst onto the urban scene with its celebration of novel living pat-
terns, its automobiles, its frenetic materialistic orientations, and its
utterly child-centered family life should have provoked such anger, frustra-
tion, and thinly disguised envy among the carping critics who wrote about it.
Now that the postwar epoch has drawn to a close, and we can view this spec-
tacular period in more balanced historical and geographical perspective, it
seems to me that it was Ignorance that lay behind the fear and the scolding
of suburbia on the part of intellectual elites. Today I sense, if not ac-
ceptance of suburbia, then at least a wider tolerance and sometimes even a
touch of nostalgia for it. We understand it better so we can pretend it is
rather under control. To a large degree the suburbanization process has
increasingly been brought under control. We have an increasing sense that
rates of change have declined as growth control systems are being installed,
many years after they were probably needed.
But if nostalgia is not what it once was, neither are the postwar sub-
urbs that make up a large share of metropolitan America today. The tract
houses and the young families of those postwar decades were merely the first
round of building, occupancy, aging, and maintenance. More recent rounds
have brought a diversity of households and steady modifications of the houses
and the landscaping around them..
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Rebecca Smith's study expands these themes with vivid details drawn from
the Twin Cities and elsewhere in the country. The study provides useful an-
swers to many questions that needed to be asked about the current situation
in those postwar suburbs, and it sets the stage for additional, comparative
studies of corresponding areas in other metropolitan regions.
John S. Adams
Director,
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs
University of Minnesota
June 1978
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INTRODUCTION
The decade that followed the end of World War II was a boom period in
many aspects of American life. As is usual in the case of economic and busi-
ness matters, the consequences of this boom have long faded into history and
left little tangible evidence by which we may judge its magnitude, except in
two respects. The first of these, the postwar baby boom, has received con-
siderable attention over the years as America has watched the offspring of
this highly active postwar period gradually age and, by virtue of their mul-
titudes, create havoc in one after another of America's institutional set-
tings--primary school, secondary school, college, and in the job market--and
finally having reached full maturity, be the cause of another flurry of ac-
tivity as the now-bloated system suffers the pains of contracting to normal
proportions. The second of these, the housing construction boom, has re-
ceived far less attention over the years even though its offspring too have
aged and matured, and have had irremediable effects on America's "settings,"
though not necessarily its institutions. The consequences of the postwar
housing boom that exploded into the suburbs and caused so much fear and
loathing during that first decade, seem to have been all but forgotten as
they became an accepted--indeed, characteristic--style of American life.
House building came to a near stand-still during the war years: in
1943, building permits were issued for only three houses in Minneapolis (City
of Minneapolis 1943). This housing shortage was exacerbated when, after the
war, larger incomes and a high rate of family formation released a surge of
pent-up demand for housing. The situation was critical in some cities where
families could find no shelter; but for the most part it created hardships
where it was necessary for families to "double-up" in housing accommdations.
The government met this need by instituting several programs to increase the
number and accessibility of new houses. Private industry, for its part, con-
structed masses of new houses as quickly and as cheaply as it could. The re-
sulting residential explosion--"whole square miles of identical square boxes
spreading like gangrene" across the countryside (Keats 1956, p. xi)--is well-
known and well documented. It received immediate criticism on two counts:
first, that these areas were so poorly planned and so shoddily built that
they were certainly the slums of tomorrow; and second, that the physical,
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social, and demographic homogeneity of the new residential developments
instilled a devotion to middle-class values that threatened to destroy the
traditional American adherence to freedom and independence of lifestyle.
This paper will consider in greater detail the events and conditions
that molded the postwar housing boom at the national scale, and then examine
how these various forces were sublimated in the case of housing construction
in the Twin Cities area. Finally, an in-depth analysis will explore the his-
tory of residential change in some fairly typical postwar neighborhoods. The
scale of analysis descends from the national to the neighborhood level since
no one perspective could answer all questions about this particular housing
era.
PART I: THE NATIONAL HOUSING BOOM
CAUSES
Most cities in the United States were suffering from an acute housing
shortage by the time World War II ended. During the war, migration into
cities, harsh housing construction cutbacks; and a high marriage rate com-
bined to create severe shortages of housing units (HHFA 1950, p. 10). After
the war, returning veterans caused the rate of family formation to sky-rocket
even higher. The economy was healthy, production was up, and so incomes were
higher than they had been. Most importantly, expectations were high. After
cutting back or going without such everyday items as sugar and gasoline,
Americans were ready to fulfill a few of their dreams, and one of these
dreams was to own a home and a piece of land.
Despite this strong demand for new housing, there were several re-
straints on the veterans' 'home-buying ability. The returning veteran gener-
ally had little in the way of cash reserves for making a down payment on a
house, from a lender's point of view he had unpredictable long-term financial
prospects and so was a risky customer. There was also, of course, a finite
amount of money that could be channeled into the mortgage market. There were
constraints too on the homebuilder. There were shortages of essential build-
ing materials immediately after the war. Factories which had been converted
for war-time production purposes had to be reconverted. No sooner had these
material shortages been cleared-up than defense building for the Korean con-
flict caused new shortages.
FEDERAL HOUSING ACTIVITIES
The federal government responded to the housing crisis with several pro-
grams that would regulate production in order to make housing available to
the greatest number of households in the shortest period of time. The 1949
Housing Act was conceived in this spirit. Its purpose was to provide a de-
cent shelter to every American. The programs that had the most profound ef-
fect on housing construction were the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
and Veterans' Administration (VA) mortgage insurance programs. These pro-
grams empowered the housing boom by keeping interest rates low (4 to 4 1/2
percent) and making credit-lending virtually risk proof for lending institu-
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tions. The two programs worked through slightly different mechanisms.
The VA's Veteran's Loan Guaranty Program was instituted in June 1944 as
part of the Serviceman's Readjustment Act. Its purpose was, "to aid veter-
ans in their postwar readjustment to civilian life by making available to
them mortgage financing on liberal equity terms and at low interest costs"
(82nd Congress 1952, p. 8). _World War 11 veterans had up to ten years after
the end of the war to use their entitlement (in 1947 the limit was extended
to July 1957). The procedure worked as follows: a veteran wishing to buy a
home had to find a lender willing to accept a mortgage on the home. The VA
would then appraise the home and attach a "reasonable value." If the sales
price was less than the reasonable value, the mortgage was eligible for the
guaranty. The program originally guaranteed 50 percent of the mortgage
amount, up to a maximum of $2,000 (there was no limit on the amount of the
loan, only on the amount that could be guaranteed). This maximum rose fairly
quickly to $4,000 in 1945, and up to $7,500 by 1950. Maximum interest on VA
guaranteed loans was 4 percent and mortgages had twenty year terms. In 1948,
the VA set minimum construction standards for homes on which it guaranteed
loans as a means of protecting the home buyer.
The FHA's loan guaranty program actually dates from 1934 and the passage
of the National Housing Act. Its scale of activity was fairly unremarkable
until after World War II, however. The purpose of the program was to encour-
age private lending institutions to make money available to home buyers. The
FHA directed its operations at the lower-priced portions of the housing mar-
ket. Anyone was eligible to apply for an FHA loan guaranty. The procedure
was that the borrower, having found a house and a lender, asked the lender to
apply for the guaranty. The FHA would evaluate the property and attach a
reasonable normal value, similar to the VA procedure. Unlike the veterans
program, however, the amount of the mortgage was limited by the FHA's ap-
praisal. Under its Section 203 program, the FHA would insure up to 80 per-
cent of the appraised value of the property, up to a maximum mortgage amount
in 1947 of $16,000 (somewhat lower for single-family homes). The applicant's
credit would be checked and, if acceptable, the loan would be approved under
FHA terms. These terms included a twenty year maturity and maximum 4 1/2
percent interest. The FHA charged an annual insurance premium of 1/2 percent
making the effective interest rate 5 percent. Under its Section 603 program,
which was aimed specifically at the small-home market, the FHA insured up to
90 percent of the 'necessary current cost" of a house, but the mortgage
amount was not to exceed $5,400 on a single-family unit. The 603 mortgage
had a maximum twenty-five year term and 4 percent interest rate (FHA 1947,
P. 13).
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was established in 1938
to provide a secondary mortgage market for FHA insured loans. In 1948, FNMA
was authorized to buy VA insured loans as well, and in 1950 it was given a
major increase in its authorization to buy mortgages. The FNMA was one of
many regulatory schemes the federal government used to keep the housing market
active. Other schemes worked directly to keep the number of housing starts as
high as possible in order to house the greatest number of families. The gov-
ernment accomplished this in part by placing maximum limits on the amount of
materials used in house building that were in short supply, thus encouraging
construction of small- or moderate-sized houses. The best tools for this
purpose were the appraisal methods of the FHA and VA loan guaranty programs.
Both agencies were rather: severe in the favoritism they showed toward low-
cost houses.
In June 1945, restrictions on home building were lifted. Before this
date, the government had set limits on the number of housing starts allow-
able, as well as price ceilings on the cost of construction, and builders had
to apply for a priority number in order to construct a house. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the boom in private housing construction that began in 1946. Jux-
taposed to the total number of housing starts is the number of units started
under FHA and VA inspection. These figures, while impressive, underestimate
the role played by the mortgage guaranty programs since they are based on
first compliance inspections and many units were brought into compliance
after the initial inspection. The Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA)
estimated that fully one-half of the units started in 1950 were begun with
financing supported by FHA and VA mortgage guarantees (HHFA 1952, p. 2).
The FHA and VA programs were not indiscriminate in their influence on
housing construction. Figure 2 shows that, until the mid-1950s, the average
price of new homes guaranteed by the VA was well below the computed index of
average construction cost. The average sales price for homes covered by FHA
guarantees in 1950 was $9,033 (FHA 1950, p. 54), also well below the Boeckh
Index.
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Figure 1. Private Housing Construction.
Data from: US Census 1975, pp. 639, 641.
The Housing Industry 
The structure of the housing industry was somewhat changed after the
war. The transformation actually began during the war when the firms that
were able to hold on through the cutbacks and to work with the government in
getting contracts and priorities to build were able to expand their scale of
production (Maisel 1953, p. 13). After the war, the combined forces of econ-
omic growth, strong housing demand, and easy credit encouraged large-scale
production and gave rise to the operative or merchant builder. Maisel clas-
sified home builders into three categories according to their scale of opera-
tions:
small builders: built 1-24 houses per year
medium builders: built 25-99 houses per year
large builders: built more than 100 houses per year.
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In 1949, the year Maisel made his study, there were 119,600 home builders in
the United States, of which 115,000 were small builders. It was the activi-
ties of the minority of builders, those in the medium and large categories,
that set the pace and character of housing construction: the 4 percent of
the builders that fell into this category built 45 percent of the houses con-
structed in 1949 (Maisel 1953, p. 22). This was a fairly characteristic pat-
tern throughout the postwar era. Architectural Forum reported in April 1949
that the merchant builder--defined as a builder who builds ahead of demand,
as opposed to the custom builder who responds to specific demand--accounted
for 80 percent of housing production (p. 81).
Large-scale home building was facilitated by new construction techniques
that allowed mass-production of houses. Architectural standardization made
it possible to use precut lumber and prefabricated parts, such as roof trusses,
in order to cut material costs. Specialization of labor and assembly-line
methods enabled builders to cut labor costs. Large-scale production was epit-
omized in the massive output of the Levitt Company which built 4,000 houses
per year in the early 1950s, and could boast of finishing one house every
twelve minutes, or forty houses per day at the peak of its season. Few build-
ers reached the capacity of the Levitt Company--one Minneapolis firm boasted
of finishing one house every eight hours, one-fortieth the Levitt's output--
and none received the notoriety of the Levitts, who were the exemplary builders
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of the day and praised as "the best thing that has happened to the housing
industry in this century" (Fortune 1952, p. 155).
The massive home building operations were aimed at middle- and lower-
middle-class home buyers. Styles emphasized the cheapest, smallest possible
houses, in order to make them both accessible to the masses of home buyers and
within the range acceptable to the federal mortgage programs. Builders
chafed under price limitations imposed by the "reasonable normal value" set
by the FHA and VA on acceptable houses. Trade journals were full of criti-
cisms of FHA practices. Builders questioned the worthiness of houses built
for below a certain price. There comes a point s they complained, when the
builder must take the value out of the house faster than he takes the dollars
out of the price (House and Home, July 1952, p. 67). Architectural Forum re-
ported in a 1949 issue on an economy house drive in which the forces of gov-
ernment, labor, and industry met to discuss the possibility of building a
good $6,000 house. They came away agreeing that it was virtually impossible.
The lowest price would be at least $8,000 to $10,000 (March 1949, p. 14).
Despite the hardships it imposed, home builders complied with the stan-
dards of the mortgage guaranty programs. Construction loans were difficult
to get unless the plans complied with FHA standards. Compliance also assured
the home builders of a ready market for their houses, which meant the quick
return of capital to put to use in more construction. When the Levitts
opened a model home and sales office for a new development, buyers camped oun
the doorstep days in advance and signed sales agreements as fast as ever they
could. Levittown, Gans states, could not have been built without the FHA,
because lenders would not have risked loans on the buyers that Levittown at-
tracted (1967, p. 14).
There was no small number of critics who would have preferred that
Levittown had never been built. Their feelings applied mutually to all hous-
ing "developments" that sprouted from the efforts of the large-scale home
builder. In order to take advantage of techniques of mass-production, build-
ers found it necessary to use standardized architectural features in their
homes and to produce homes in large volumes. The type of fast, cheap build-
ing that characterized large-scale construction made it very difficult to re-
sist uniformity. Builders achieved economies by using a single plan, and
without so much as an architect to design the plan. The type of house that
resulted was known as the "GI house", or "builder's house." It was typically
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a small, rectangular, one- or one and a half-story house, such as a rambler
or the Cape Cod style made popular by the Levitts (figure 3). It included
Figure 3. Typical house styles: Cape Cod (above) and rambler.
expansion space in the form of either an unfinished attic or basement, rarely
both. It had minimal accessories, no frills, and used many precut or prefab-
ricated parts. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, these houses ranged be-
tween 550 and 800 square feet and were generally priced between $6,000 and
$9,000. Two-bedroom houses predominated in the early years, but by 1950
there was a move toward three- and four-bedroom houses as households got
larger and demanded more from the house.
The builder's house soon became the mainstay of American residential
architecture and was constructed by even the small builders who aimed their
product at the middle-income market. Tracts of land ranging in size from a
single block to an entire community were developed according to the floor plan
the builder was using that year. The only variation that was evident in
these tracts was the color, facade, or garage placement. Very few builders
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bothered to use siting--placement of the house on the lot--as a means of
creating variation. The community of Cape Cod houses shown in figure 4 ap-
peared in Architectural Forum with a caption that reminded the reader that
"Cape Cod never looked like this" (March 1949, p. 100). Mumford has elo-
quently described the postwar tracts as, "a multitude of uniform, unidentifi-
able houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform distances, on uniform roads, in
a treeless communal waste..." (Mumford 1961, p. 486).
The majority of postwar housing construction took place at the edge of
the built up area, in the newly-developing suburbs, where land was cheap and
plentiful. An improved highway network and widespread automobile ownership
made it feasible for people who worked in the city to live in the suburbs.
There was nothing intrinsically different about the suburbs. As Gans bluntly
states, "postwar suburbia is really not novel at all; it is only the latest
phase of the urban growth process: (Gans 1968, p. 132). The rate of growth
of the suburbs was very different, however, and quickly transformed the resi-
Figure 4. Cape Cod?
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dential geography of most cities. It was the speed of development, and the
style and quality of house that characterized this development, that caused
so much disquiet over the "miles of new slums raping the virgin landscape"
(House and Home, October 1952, p. 81).
RESPONSE TO THE HOUSING BOOM
The Physical Aspects 
Response to the postwar housing boom was critical of both the style of
house and the character of suburbia. The GI house was small; it lacked
storage space; it was poorly planned so that dining areas were in the path of
major circulation; there were no play areas for children, no privacy (Keats
1956, p. 47). It was claimed that the houses were poorly built and likely to
deteriorate very quickly. Fortune, which in 1952 praised the Levitts as the
best thing that had happened to home building, three years earlier had printed
the view that "the long rows of identical box-like dwellings in every suburb
from Long Island to San Mateo gave the old aphorism 'There's no place like
home' a slightly hollow ring" (Fortune 1949, p. 11).
Criticism of suburbia ranged from derisive statements about its drearily
efficient uniformity to genuine concern for what had great potential to be-
come "the slums of tomorrow" (Moses 1950, p. 4). The communities were said
to be poorly planned; faced with problems of sewage, water, drainage, gar-
bage, and transportation; and lacking most of the services, both public and
private, that a community needs to survive. It was claimed that the houses
were of shoddy construction and the residents were constantly moving in and
out, no one seeming to consider this their permanent home.
Part of the blame for the purportedly sad state of affairs in suburbia
has been leveled at the mortgage guaranty programs. The FHA has been ac-
cused of discouraging progress and quality in homebuilding by favoring small,
cheap housing. The FHA is also accused of ignoring the other aspects of a
decent home, aspects such as landscaping, streets, and local services. The
agency did not use its power to coordinate development with public services,
but rather allowed developments to burgeon helter-skelter across the suburban
landscape (Warner 1972, p. 234).
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The Sociological Aspects 
The mass movement of middle class households to the suburbs led to the
creation of a new type of community which, in Mumford's terms, caricatured
both the historic city and the traditional suburban refuge. The suburb, once
an escape, was now a uniform environment from which escape was impossible
(Mumford 1961, p. 486). Whereas the physical reality of the suburbs may have
met with mixed reviews and a smug wait-and-see attitude, the social reality
was confronted with we and terror that struck the hearts of the most astute
observers and even some of the people who lived there.
There were three major complaints about the social atmosphere of postwar
suburbia. First, it was socially homogeneous; hopelessly homogeneous. Not
only were the houses identical, but they were inhabited by people "whose age,
income, number of children, problems, habits, conversation, dress, possess-
sions and perhaps even bloodtype are also precisely like yours" (Keats 1956,
p. xi). The architecture of suburbia stood as a monument to its social real-
ity. The people who lived there had, according to the preeminently quotable
Frank Lloyd Wright, "sold out the birthright of their democracy to join
mobocracy" (Minneapolis Tribune, 30 July 1952, p. 6). Second, critics argued
that suburbia was a "homogenizer": moving to suburbia transformed the indi-
vidual, aroused the desire to conform to the values of suburbia. Suburbia
repressed individuality; the people who lived there were "incapable of real
friendships, [they were] alienated, atomized and depersonalized" (Gans 1967,
p. xvi). Finally, and most reprehensible according to the critics, suburbia
was middle class, and the values of suburbia were middle-class values; in-
deed, suburbia was--perish the thought--bourgeois. Suburbia was the exempli-
fication of the moneyed middle class: Fortune cautioned its readers that
anyone who wanted to market anything in America--from appliances to zithers--
had better consider the buying habits of suburbanites (November 1953).
Actually, this view, expounded mainly in the popular literature and
journals, came to be known as the "myth of suburbia" (Gans, 1967; Berger,
1968). The myth was exploded in the mid-1960s when sociologists, aided by
hindsight nurtured by ten years of observation and experience, began to shed
light on what suburbia was really like, and why. The real reality of subur-
bia was this:
12
Before World War II, the suburbs had primarily been a refuge for the up-
per-middle class. Widespread automobile ownership, mass production of hous-
ing, and ease of financing after the war made it possible for the less afflu-
ent to move to suburbia. Among those who migrated to the suburbs after the
war, the majority were lower-middle class (Gans 1968, p. 138).
Some suburbs did tend to be homogeneous in terms of social class and
ethnicity, though no more so than many urban neighborhoods. The main charac-
teristics affecting the choice of a house are social class and stage of life-
cycle. One might expect that an area offering uniform houses of the same
price and size would attract families similar in these two characteristics.
The expansion of the argument to include homogeneity of attitudes, habits,
and bloodtype are obvious exaggerations. A more down-to-earth viewer con-
ceded that families living in postwar housing tracts had nothing more in com-
mon than the price of the house and the age of their children (Gruenberg
1955, p. 134).
The charge of conformity among suburbanites goes hand-in-hand with that
of homogeneity. Belief in the conforming influence of suburbia was so strong
that Berger conceived an entire study to watch a group of working-class fami-
lies be transformed by their suburban experience into middle class conform-
ists. He found, instead, that they remained basically unchanged after the
move to suburbia (Berger 1968).
The myth was dispelled: the social character of postwar suburbia was
explained not by virtue of its location with respect to the city limits, but
as symptomatic of a lifestyle that was prevalent. In the final analysis,
suburbs were found to be just new locations for basic American values
(Ktsanes and Reissman 1959, p. 187). The degree of uniformity found among
suburbanites was not caused by the style or uniformity of the housing stock;
it was the result of "the times," which were characterized by a large number
of newly formed families in the housing market. Postwar building techniques
allowed entire neighborhoods to be developed at once. In older neighborh-
hoods, houses were more frequently built one-by-one by the owners, a process
which left room for a great amount of variety among the residents in terms of
age, income, and family status. The development of postwar suburbia did not
build-in social homogeneity among residents so much as it built out one
highly visible source of heterogeneity, the diversity of housing style.
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PART II: THE TWIN CITIES' HOUSING BOOM
There's a green one and a pink one.
And a blue one and a yellow one.
And they're all made out of ticky tacky,
And they all look just the same.
Malvina Reynolds, "Little Boxes"
The phenomenon of the postwar housing development spread from coast to
coast, from Levittown, New York to San Francisco where David Bohannon boasted
that after the war he would not sell houses, but neighborhoods (Architectural 
Forum, March 1949, p. 8). A much more common phenomenon was the row of box-
like houses that Malvina Reynolds described, that appeared in literally every
suburb from Long Island to San Mateo. In the Twin Cities there were no
community-sized postwar developments, but there were plenty of examples of
interminable rows of uniform houses like the one pictured above. This sec-
tion will explore the postwar housing boom as it occurred in the Twin Cities.
VOLUME OF HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
The 1970 U.S. Census of population and housing reports that of the hous-
ing units existing in the Twin Cities SMSA at the time of the census count,
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183,379 had been built between 1940 and 1960. The respective figures for the
two decades are 56,807 units built 1940-49 and 126,572 units built 1950-59.
The huge difference in these two numbers suggests the severity of housing
construction cutbacks during the war years, and the enthusiasm of the postwar
housing boom, which began in 1945 and only started to subside after 1955.
The housing boom had a slower start in the Twin Cities than in many cities:
between 1940 and 1950 the number of housing units in the Twin Cities in-
creased by 19 percent, as compared to a national average of 23 percent
(Minneapolis Tribune, 9 December 1952, p. 15).
_
Total # of housing units
1960 1970
.
463,110 574,826
Units built prior to 1940* 273,381 224,960 1
% of Total Stock 59% 38%
Units built 194.0-1959 187,447 183,379
% of Total Stock 410 32%
Units built 1960-1970 ... 166,467
% of Total Stock
- 29%
Table I. Housing Construction Breakdown for Twin Cities Area, 1960
and 1970. Data from: U.S. Census, 1960, 1970.
The 183,379 housing units built between 1940 and 1960 constitute 32
percent of the total housing stock in the Twin Cities as reported in the
1970 census. This is not a startling figure when an almost equal number--
166,487 or 29 percent of the 1970 housing stock--was built in the decade
1960-1970. When put in the perspective of the 1960 housing situation, the
figures are somewhat more remarkable: the 187,447 new units constituted 41
percent of the housing g stock existing in 1960 (table 1). In absolute num-
bers, housing in the Twin Cities nearly doubled in twenty years. This fact
alone may conjure up images of a mushrooMing urban landscape swallowing up
the countryside at the edges of the city. When one considers that most of
The difference between the 1960 and 1970 figures for units built before
1940 is presumably due partly to a certain number of units that were removed
from the stock, partly to differences in reporting.
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this new construction was single-family detached homes built on 50-70 foot
lots, as opposed to the relatively larger number of town houses and other
multiple-unit structures built since 1960, it is not difficult to sense the
impact of the postwar housing boom on the Twin Cities' residential landscape.
Figure 5 shows how the size of the urbanized area burgeoned after 1945,
mainly due to new low- and medium-density subdivisions.
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Figure 5. Trend in Size of Urbanized Area.
Data from: Borchert, 1961, p. 56.
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Although demand for housing in the Twin Cities remained fairly stable
throughout the first ten years after World War It, the ability to build and
to buy houses fluctuated with changing federal restrictions on building ma-
terials and credit.* An initial rush after the war for FHA and VA loan guar-
antees declined between 1947 and 1949. The number of loans peaked again in
1950, which was also a peak year for housing starts in the Twin Cities, but
declined again in 1951.
*Much of the information in this section has been garnered from articles
that appeared in the Minneapolis Tribune between 1945 and 1955.
Mak
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After 1951, VA loans were very difficult to obtain in the Twin Cities.
Many lending institutions stopped handling them altogether. Although both
the VA and FHA raised their interest rates 1/2 percent in early 1950, lending
rates on government securities increased by 2 percent, narrowing the gap be-
tween federally guaranteed loans and other types of long-term investments,
thus making other investments more attractive to lenders. Local lenders re-
quired 15-20 percent down on VA loans, much higher than the program's re-
quired 5 percent down. Lenders also tightened up their policies on eligibil-
ity for VA loans with tough credit restrictions. The volume of FHA loans was
similarly affected by the tight money market, although these loans fared
better since they usually carried a substantial downpayment. Conventional
loans were favored over federally guaranteed loans because they carried a 5
percent interest rate and typically required a higher down payment.
The character of housing demand changed over the span of the first ten
postwar years. Two-bedroom bungalows were in greatest demand immediately af-
ter the war. Since it Was a seller's market, buyers settled for houses with-
out any frills or accessories. By 1951 the newspapers had begun to mention a
shift in demand toward larger homes. Growing families were cited as the ma-
jor reason for this shift. Home-buyers also began to demand more built-in
features with their houses: garages, utility room, one and a half bathrooms,
and so forth. The local housing market in 1952 was seen as neither a buyer's
or seller's market, but the balance was sure to be tipped soon and competi-
tion forced builders to provide some added features in their homes and use
more aggressive selling techniques.
LOCATION OF NEW CONSTRUCTION
Postwar housing construction in the Twin Cities occurred primarily in
what may now be called first-tier suburbs. There is a simple reason for
this: as Map 1 testifies, most of the land in the central cities was already
developed by 1940. Map 1 differentiates census tracts that had more than 50
percent of their 1970 housing inventory built in each of three time periods:
prior to 1940, 1940-1959, and 1960-1970. Almost all the tracts in both Min-
neapolis and St. Paul fall into the first category. It may be said then that
the central cities were, for the most part, substantially developed by 1940.
The logical location for concentrated activity would be the areas immediately
adjacent to the built-up area, that is, the first-tier suburbs. Just as Gans
17
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concluded for American cities in general, so in the Twin Cities it was true
that postwar suburbia was merely the latest phase of the urban growth pro-
cess.
Data on the number of housing starts in the suburbs are highly unreli-
able because many suburbs did not require building permits, and did not have
systems set up for keeping an inventory of new housing starts until well into
the 1950s. The graph in figure 6, compiled from several sources of informa-
tion, shows the differences in number of housing starts between the cities
and those suburbs that kept records of housing starts. George Sandquist,
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then president of the Minneapolis Home Builders Association, predicted in
1952 that 85 percent of new home building would be in the suburbs (Minneapo-
lis Tribune, 17 February 1952, p. 2F). After 1950 construction rates in the
central cities began to decline while building in the suburbs remained high.
This is in part due to better reporting from the suburban communities, but
the declining rate in the cities is also explained by the disappearance of
developable land--by 1956 Minneapolis was 96-98 percent developed (City of
Minneapolis 1959, p. 5). The housing construction that occurred in Minneapo-
lis and St. Paul in these later years was mostly concentrated at the outer
edges of the city along the suburban boundaries.
Overall, housing construction in the Twin Cities fell after a peak in
1950, and then built back up to a second peak in 1955. Local newspapers at-
tributed the decline in 1951 to two causes: shortages of vital materials,
and federal anti inflation measures, in particular "Regulation X," as the
newspapers referred to it, a measure passed in the fall of 1950 that made it
difficult to obtain conventional loans. Regulation X made its major impact
on low-cost housing by effectively decreasing demand, so that construction
money was channeled into a smaller number of high-priced housing starts.
Suburban growth meant that new residential developments expanded into
the surrounding farmland. Wherever a farmer was willing to sell his land,
a developer was generally ready to turn the cornfield into a new subdivision.
Table 2 tabulates the diminishing amount of farmland in metropolitan counties
County
•
1945-1950
Acres % of
Lost Total Area
1950-1954
Acres % of
Lost Total Area
1954-1959
Acres % of
Lost Total Area
1959-1964
Acres % of
Lost Total Area
1964-1969
Acres % of
Lost Total Area
Anoka 27 10 46 17 67 25 95 35 114 42
Dakota 14 4 14 4 34 9 44 12 75 21
Hennepin 25 7 45 12 63 17.4 82 24 120 33
Ramsey 11 11 20 20 29 28 34 33 37 36
Washington 5 2 15 6 32 13 51 20 84 34
Table 2. Cumulative Acres of Farmland Lost (in thousands of acres).
Data from: US Census, 1949, 1952, 1956, 1962, 1967, 1972.
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over a period of twenty-four years. Expansion of the urbanized area was most
rapid to the west of Minneapolis. Greatest losses of farmland acreage occur-
red in Hennepin County in the first years of the postwar growth, although
other counties lost a nearly equal percentage of their farmland after 1954
(except for Ramsey County, which had only 22,000 acres of farmland left by
1954). The location of new development was affected by the terrain: larger
developments stayed on the flat outwash plains, which are found much more
commonly in the areas bounding Minneapolis than St. Paul. Builders of small-
er developments and/or more expensive homes preferred the rolling morainic
landscape. Transportation routes and existing development patterns also af-
fected the pattern of new growth. Postwar residential expansion essentially
accentuated an existing development pattern characterized by major spokes of
growth that either followed transportation routes or favored landscape amen-
ities (Abler et. al. 1976, p. 409).
THE LOCAL HOUSING INDUSTRY
The housing industry in the Twin Cities included very few of the large-
scale home builders, as defined by Maisel. The local housing boom was perpe-
trated by literally hundreds of small builders, building between 6 and 20
homes per year. There were several dozen builders who constructed as many as
50 to 100 houses per year. One of the largest local builders was the Orrin
Thompson Company which was constructing 400 homes per year by the early
1950s. Few of the other local builders managed anywhere near this volume of
activity.
Annual volume of production limited the amount of capital that individ-
ual home builders could invest in land at any one time. Local home builders
developed land in three typical concentrations. Small-scale builders gener-
ally worked on individual lots or in scattered plots, which were concentra-
tions of three to eight contiguous lots. The postwar developers either filled
in vacant lots among the existing houses, or several builders, working simul-
taneously, bought and developed scattered sites in newly developing subdivi-
sions. Scattered lot development occurred near the city's boundary--the Cam-.
den neighborhood in north Minneapolis and sections of northern Richfield were
developed in this way. These neighborhoods have more of an urban than subur-
ban character: the lot sizes vary between thirty and fifty feet as opposed
to the fifty to seventy foot lots in the suburbs; because of the small scale
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of operations and filling between older homes, there is more variety of house
style than is found in suburban neighborhoods.
The size of postwar residential development found most commonly in the
Twin Cities area is a space of three to five blocks of concentrated building
by a single home builder. The builder typically bought a piece of land this
size in a new subdivision and began a project that would take one to two
years to complete. The process of subdividing the land was carried out by
the original landowner who filed the plat. Rectangular gridiron layouts,
with no efforts made to provide contours or curves, abound in developments
of this type. The home builder laid out and black-topped the streets, built
houses, planted boulevard trees, and provided for the installment of cesspools
and utilities. The builder would often buy additional land in the same area
after the original project was under way. However, when other builders were
active in the area, adjacent land was often no longer available, and so the
builder would begin a new project in a different area. The pattern of resi-
dential development that resulted from the activities of the medium-scale
developers shows much intermingling of projects by different developers, and
projects of a single developer scattered over a large area.
Large-scale developments were slow to emerge in the Twin Cities. In
1951, Gerald Iverson built 102 homes in Richfield, which the Minneapolis Tri-
bune described as "one of the largest concentrated home developments in the
area (24 June 1951, p. 7E). By 1953 and 1954, developments with 150-250
houses were commonly advertised in the newspapers. With the exception of the
large companies, most of the builders involved in large-scale developments -
required at least two to three years to complete the development.
Large-scale developments differed from small- and medium-sized projects
in that the developer conceived the project in its totality at the beginning,
rather than making later additions to the area he developed. In all other
respects, however, the larger developments were built-up in essentially the
same way as the smaller projects. The large-scale developments in the Twin
Cities were generally smaller than those described in the national litera-
ture. They were also not "developments" as such, because the home builders
did not provide for commercial facilities and public services to serve the
residents.
In spite of the relatively small-scale character of the industry, post-
war housing construction in the Twin Cities achieved no small degree of uni-
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formity in style. Among those builders with a small volume of production
there were a large number of custom home builders who catered to the housing
demands of individual households, usually in the higher income ranges of the
demand spectrum. Many of the small-scale builders, and certainly all of the
medium- and large-scale builders, fell into the class of merchant builders
that catered to the large volume of middle-income housing demand. There was
very little variation among builders in the style of house they produced.
In the late 1940s, the two-bedroom Cape Cod style bungalow with expandable
attic was the most common type of house built locally (figure 7). By 1950
•
7.7
••••••
Figure 7. Local Cape Cod house style.
the Cape Cods were being replaced by attic-less "ramblers" with unfinished
basements (figure 8). These unpretentious four-room houses provided 720-900
square feet of living space and sold in the local housing market for $7,500
to $9,000. Don Morrison recently described his first Minneapolis home to
Minneapolis Star readers: "It was one of about 250 ticky-tack postwar boxes--
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identical except for alternating peak or hip roofs, vertical or horizontal
siding and four assorted pastel shades of paint--that were set down on a new-
ly skinned cornfield in Crystal Village. It was of prefab construction with
out a scintilla of class or a single elegant feature" (2 December 1976, p. 5C).
As home buyers began to demand larger homes, the two-bedroom rambler evolved
ao.
Figure 8. Local rambler house style.
during the mid-1950s into a three-bedroom rambler that sold for $11,000 to
$12,000 (figure 9). Demands from home buyers for more frills and accessories
also forced home builders to provide some added attractions with their homes.
The billboard pictured in figure 10 dates from this phase of the housing boom.
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Figure 9. Local three-bedroom rambler, vintage 1955.
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Figure 10. Twin Cities new home advertisement, circa 1953-1954.
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SOCIOLOGY OF POSTWAR NEIGHBORHOODS
Definition of Postwar Tracts 
In order to examine the postwar housing boom from the perspective of the
overall residential geography of the Twin Cities, areas of postwar residen-
tial development were defined and census data was used to compare them to all
other residential areas in the metropolitan area. The postwar residential
areas were defined as any census tract where at least 65 percent of the hous-
ing stock as reported in the 1970 U.S. Census was built between 1940 and
1960. The broad span of years was necessary in order to encompass the active
period of postwar housing construction which lasted from 1945 to 1956. The
resulting sample contained sixty census tracts located primarily in the first-
tier suburbs (map 2). The sample tracts represent 12.3 percent of the tracts
in the Twin Cities Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as of 1970.
These tracts account for 28 percent of the housing built in the metropolitan
area during the twenty year span, indicating a high concentration of postwar
housing construction. Concentrations were higher in some areas than in
others: sample tracts in Hennepin County account for 16 percent of the
tracts and 35 percent of the postwar housing construction in that county.
Analysis of Census Data 
In order to analyze the postwar residential tracts in terms relevant to
the suburban image presented in Part I, census data for several variables
were used to compare postwar tracts with all census tracts in the SMSA.
Table 3 presents the mean values for these two subsets of tracts for three
census years.
Comparison of the means shows that the characteristics of the postwar
tracts did not drastically change over the twenty year period. The postwar
tracts are above the metropolitan average on indices of socio-economic sta-
tus: income, occupation, education. The postwar tracts are characterized by
younger families, with higher percentages of school-age children and higher
densities per unit. House values in postwar tracts are generally lower than
house values elsewhere in the SMSA in both the 1950 and 1970 censuses. The
large number of newly built houses in postwar areas in 1960 pushed the aver-
age median house value in these tracts above the metropolitan average.
Three census variables--median income, percent of the workforce in pro-
fessional occupations, and percent of the population in kindergarten through
26
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Census Variable
1950 1960 
. 1970
Mpls./ Postwar SMSA Postwar SMSA Postwar
St. Paul Sample Sample Sample
General:
Median Income $3,200 $3,700 $6,800 $7,800 $11,000 $13,200
Median House Value $9,898 $9,087 $14,600 $16,600 $21,500 $20,700
Number of persons
per unit 2.8 3.4 2.9 3.8 2.8 3.3
Percent of housing
units owner-occupied 53% 64% 652 87% 63% 80%
Age:
Percent of population
under 18 25.7% 38.1% 36.7% 45.5% 36.3% 38.0%
Percent of population
in kindergarten
through eighth grade 12.7% 15.9% 17.7% 22.0% 19.0% 20.7%
Employment:
Percent of workforce
self-employed 9.9% 10.5% 7.6% 8.5% 4.4% 4.3%
Percent of employed
population in pro-
fessional positions 11.5% 13.4% 13.8% 16.6% 18.3% 17.9%
Education:
Median school years
completed 11.0% 11.7% 12.1% 12.4% 12.4% 12.6%
, Percent of population
(25 years and older)
college-graduated 8.3% 9.1% 10.4% 13.4% 14.8% 15.1%
Table 3. Comparison of Census Data for Postwar Tracts and all Census Tracts.
eighth grade--were chosen to examine more closely the relationship of postwar
tracts to other tracts in terms of the social and demographic characteristics
of the residents. The first two variables measure socioeconomic character-
istics of the residents. The third variable serves as a surrogate for stage
of life-cycle. For the 1950 census a substitute measure--percent of the pop-
ulation five to fourteen years of age--was used to represent stage of life-
cycle predominant among the population.
The histograms presented in figures 11 through 19 illustrate the distri-
bution of values for the two subsets of census tracts on these variables for
three census years. Only one-third of the postwar housing construction had
been completed by 1950, so the 1950 census data may be assumed to measure an
elementary stage in the process of postwar change. The 1950 Census reported
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tract data for the central cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, and for only
a very limited "urbanized area" beyond the city limits, so that many of the
tracts in the postwar sample are omitted. In addition, subdivision of census
tracts created an increased number of tracts in the SMSA at each successive
census year. The sixty postwar tracts by 1970 tract definitions are compara-
ble in area to forty-nine tracts in the 1960 Census, and to nine tracts in
the 1950 Census.
The Developing Suburbs: 1950-1960 
If we are to believe Mumford, in 1950 the postwar tracts would have been
emerging from their position as the "refuge of the rich." In view of this, it
is not surprising to find in figure 11 that these tracts were above average
in median income in 1950. The postwar areas are clearly distinguished from
the other tracts in terms of the percentage of the population ages five
through fourteen (figure 13). By 1950 there were already a large number of
young families living in the postwar tracts. Unlike the other measures, the
occupation measure shows a high degree of diversity among postwar tracts
(figure 12).
Between 1950 and 1960, a shift in the distribution of values on these
measures is evident for all census tracts in the Twin Cities. This change is
a reflection of a continued healthy economy and high birthrate during the
first decade after World War II. Census data for 1960 most accurately por-
tray postwar suburbia. There is no evidence in the data shown in figures
14-16 that would dispel the myth that postwar suburbia was inhabited by mid-
dle-class, young families. The measures of income and family status (figures
14 and 15) show the postwar tracts grouped above the mean for the SMSA. The
concentration of postwar tracts over a narrow segment of the range of all
tracts (confined to the upper half of the distribution) suggests a high degree
of similarity among postwar tracts.
Can this evidence be extended to support the claim of homogeneity among
residents of postwar neighborhoods? The conclusion was drawn earlier that
the forces that attracted residents to new postwar housing developments dis-
criminated in favor of families with similar incomes and similar family sta-
tus, by virtue of the uniform price and the bundle of housing services of-
fered. This similarity certainly is true of the postwar sample of census
tracts. Homogeneity, however, is not a variable that is measured by the cen-
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sus, nor can it be easily discerned from census data. The type of population
homogeneity that was advocated by the suburban myth included similarity of
tastes, consumer behavior, and leisure activity. The occupation variable is
a better measure of this type of homogeneity since it seeks to identify a
split between predominately blue-collar and predominately white-collar popu-
lation groups, groups which are known to differ in their values and behavior.
Where the percentage of the population within a tract that is in professional
occupations is either very high or very low, one would expect to find a pop-
ulation homogeneous in terms of its residents' tastes and backgrounds. The
histogram in figure 15 shows that postwar areas varied widely in the propor-
tion of population that was employed in these occupations: the postwar
tracts have a distribution very similar to the distribution of the rest of
the tracts on this variable, even though the average for the postwar tracts
is slightly above the average for the SMSA.
Post-1960 Change 
The unique postwar character of the sample of postwar census tracts be-
gan to be transformed after 1960. The housing boom was on the wane by 1956-
1957 and the birthrate had declined to a near normal prewar level by the end
of the decade of the 1950s. Post-1960 housing construction in the postwar
tracts was unremarkable from housing construction elsewhere in terms of house
style and intensity of house building activity. New homes and apartment
buildings filled in the blocks that had been left vacant by postwar builders.
By 1970 the postwar suburbs were no longer on the urban fringe: the urban
frontier progressed during the 1960s into a second-tier of suburban communi.-
ties, where the majority of new residential development took place.
The 1970 census data must be examined in light of these transformations
in both the postwar tracts and the whole metropolitan area. While the post-
war tracts retain a higher average value on income and age variables than the
rest of the tracts (figures 17 and 19), the percentage of the workforce in
professional positions in the postwar tracts has actually dropped below the
metropolitan average (figure 18). The concentration of values over a narrow
part of the range is no longer apparent among postwar tracts in 1970. The
family status values are as diverse as those for occupational status. Median
incomes do, however, remain somewhat uniform among the tracts.
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The histograms indicate that over the twenty year span of census data,
there have been both absolute—changes in the structure of income, age, and
occupation in all metropolitan census tracts, and changes in the distribution
of postwar tracts relative to the distribution of all other metropolitan
tracts. Absolute changes in the values of these variables have been ex-
plained in terms of the changes that the postwar economic boom brought to
American society. Relative changes between the characteristics of postwar
residential tracts and other tracts are more pertinent to the question of a
uniquely suburban lifestyle and mentality as professed by the advocates of
the suburban myth.
The nature of the changing relationship between the postwar areas and
the remainder of the urban area is more clearly expressed in geographical
rather than statistical terms. The series of maps that follow (maps 3-11)
present the data that is contained in figures 11 through 19 in order to
illustrate the changing geographical distribution of values. Based on each
histogram, census tracts were split into five classes of roughly equal num-
ber, representing a range from extremely high to extremely low values. A
tract appearing in the extremely high category is thus in the top one-fifth
of the distribution on that variable.
Where the trend in the changing distribution of postwar tracts was only
vaguely evident in the histograms, it is precisely defined in the maps.
Concentrations of young families, and professional workers with higher than
average incomes, have moved outward from the city over time, following the
expanding urban frontier. The extremely high values for all three variables
occur primarily in the first-tier suburbs in 1960, in the areas where new
postwar home building had concentrated during the preceding decade. These
extremely high values had moved outward by 1970, leaving many postwar tracts
in average or below average classes of income, professional status, and young
family status.
It is not surprising to find young, upwardly mobile families in the vi-
cinity of new residential development. Seen in this light, postwar suburbia
was just one phase of the normal process of residential expansion that causes
a shift in the distribution of different population groups.
The phenomenon of postwar suburbia is as well explained by what happened
after 1960 as by what took place between 1940 and 1960. Some may argue that
the postwar suburban expansion was the harbinger of subsequent suburban and
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exurban growth around American cities. Be that as it may, the critics of
postwar suburbia clearly did not consider changes that would occur with the
passage of time, except to assert that the new communities would deteriorate
into slums. They imputed a sociological nature to the postwar suburbs based
on their location and type of development. Despite their structural rigidity
--houses are very durable--the nature of the postwar suburbs has changed as
a result of their changing position in the total urban environment. The
postwar suburbs occupied an -ecological niche in the urban environment which
has now been preempted by the second-ring suburbs.
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PART III: ANALYSIS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE
The sociological studies of postwar housing dealt with new developments
and the first occupants of these developments. The critics drew their apoc-
alyptic conclusions before the rapidly occupied tracts had the chance to de-
velop a neighborhood character such as is found in older neighborhoods. It
required a patina rendered by the passage of time to soothe the evil of the
suburbs. Today, some twenty-five years after their construction, the postwar
residential tracts are found to have had diverse histories. Some of these
interminable rows of houses have been softened by the maturation of boulevard
trees and other landscaping and vegetation, the addition of sidewalks and
gutters to the streets, as well as alterations on the houses themselves--room
additions, porches, garages, dormers--which dispel the original uniform char-
acter of the block (figure 20). In contrast, others stand almost as stark as
the day they were built (figure 21).
Figure 20. Postwar tract muted with landscaping.
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Figure 21. Postwar tract that retains its uniform character.
The study of change in postwar housing tracts can be taken right down to
the housing unit itself. Each house has an economic life during which it
produces a succession of "products" as different households use it (Smith 1970,
p. 17). When a family is no longer satisfied with the bundle of services of
a particular unit, it either moves or it modifies the unit. Each house ages
differently depending on the activities of the succession of owners.
For each house in a tract there is an historical profile and record of
occupancy. The postwar tracts are now one generation old. What divergent
sorts of histories have the individual units experienced? What type of di-
versity might be found among the stream of residents who have occupied a sin-
gle house or a block of houses? Are they as uniform as the census data would
lead us to believe? The analysis that follows seeks to answer these ques-
tions by exploring the occupancy histories of two typical postwar residential
neighborhoods in the suburbs around Minneapolis.
DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREAS
The two areas chosen for detailed analysis--a group of three blocks in
Richfield and a group of five blocks in St. Louis Park--are both located in
the middle of larger subdivisions that were rapidly developed between 1949
and 1951 by several small- and medium-scale home builders. The blocks were
not randomly chosen, but were chosen because they were typical of the scale
and uniformity of local postwar home building. The blocks in the two samples
include parts of projects of several builders. Map 12 details the two study
areas, giving names of builders and dates of construction. Most homes were
built between 1949-1951, but one small area dates from 1954.
'D C)
<N° b.c3
\c3""
se\
<OSc.,\>
LI til
il LI
P  
M
 1 I 0   
7 11  it08_1
ii[ ON14 9-(3
1J 'I'qi
1.1 la
 uFt
Et nii=t EtII  
n I 1 ! }a LI  71
LI
Map 12. Map of the study areas.
l -
Richfield
study area
St Louis
Park
study area
47
The houses in the two samples are almost exclusively four-room (two-
bedroom, kitchen, living room) houses that had original sales prices between
$7,000 and $9,500. Detailed characteristics of the different builder's
houses are as follows:
Richfield:
Arvid Carlson: 6 houses; 716-884 sq. ft., $8,500
Irving Fine: 37 houses, 884 sq. ft., $7,500
3 houses; 810 sq. ft., $7,000
Gunderson: 1 house; 88b sq. ft., $10,000
St. Louis Park:
Arvid Carlson: 61 houses; 720 sq. ft., $8,000 (1 for $7,500)
Ecklund and Swedlund: 27 houses; 720-952 sq. ft., $8,500-9,500
Burton and Devore: 3 houses; 720-1000 sq. ft., $7,500-10,000
E.C. Sharpe: 5 houses; 1000 sq. ft., $10,500-12,000
METHOD
For the purpose of establishing an historical profile and record of oc-
cupancy for each unit in the two neighborhoods, three types of information
were compiled:
• a record of all the owners, dates of *ownership, and occupation
of the homeowner was compiled from information provided by the
Suburban Polk Directories. The directories were begun in 1956,
so there is some uncertainty in the record before this date.
• ages of children living at each address were compiled from the
Sun Newspaper Directories. These directories were begun in
1965 and so there is some uncertainty in this data, too.
• structural modifications made to the lot and the house were
compiled from building permit records kept by each city's
administrative offices. Both St. Louis Park and Richfield
were among the suburban communities requiring building permits
by the late 1940s.
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OCCUPANCY DATA
The occupancy records for each house were grouped and analyzed for
trends. During their twenty-five year histories, 469 households have occu-
pied the houses in the two neighborhoods. The turnover rate among homeowners
was high during the first few years. By the end of the first decade, two-
thirds of the original owners had moved away. The year 1957 was a peak year
for families to move out. This was the seventh year of occupancy for the
original owners and just enough time, one might speculate, for a growing fam-
ily to outgrow the confines of a four-room house.
The annual turnover rates were erratic from year to year, fluctuating
around an average of 1-1.3 per block in the Richfield sample, to 1.7-2.3 per
block in the St. Louis Park sample. The high rate in 1961 in the St. Louis
Park sample (figure 22) is due to a single block on which nearly one-half the
houses changed hands in that year.
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Length of occupancy is biased toward short terms (figure 23). This pat-
tern is more pronounced in St. Louis Park, as shown in the respective median
length of tenure for the two samples. This works out to an average 3.09 own-
ers per house in the Richfield sample, 3.45 in the St. Louis Park sample.
These averages, however, mask a range which goes as high as ten owners per .
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Figure 23. Length of occupancy.
median
--St. Louis Park 4.5 yrs
- Richfield 7.5 yrs
20 22 24 26
house over the twenty-five year period. Each block has two or three of the
original owners remaining.
Who Moved In?
The original occupants of these two neighborhoods were distributed fair-
ly similarly among the occupational classes. Classification of occupations
was based on the system of categories used in 1970 Census of Population,
Classification of Industries and Occupations. The breakdown is as follows:
White-collar I: professional, technical and kindred workers,
managers, administrators, proprietors
White-collar 2: sales workers, clerical and kindred workers
Blue-collar : craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers,
operatives, except transport
Blue-collar 2: transport, equipment operatives, laborers
Others: retired, students
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The majority were in the two white-collar classes (table 4). However, the
sample included jobs ranging from Honeywell employees to pastor to truck
driver, hardly an homogeneous lot.
White- White- Blue- Blue-
Collar 1 Collar 2 Collar 1 Collar 2 Other Unknown
St. Louis
Park 29% 26% 26% 2% 1% 16%
Richfield 30% 17% 20% 11% 0 22%
Table 4. Occupations of Original Owners
The children of the original occupants were difficult to trace, since
Sun Directories do not go back to the year the houses were built. The infor-
mation that was found shows that families contained mostly young children.
Of the families who had no children when they bought the house, about half
would begin to have families over the next few years. As many as one-fourth
of the households had a birth of a child within a year of moving in, a fact
which by itself provides a strong indication of the stage of life cycle of
families that first settled in these houses.
Ages
No 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Children
St. Louis
Park
Richfield
15 9 13 6 8 3 3 2 1 0 1 2
8 9 3 3 2 5 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 5. Family Status of Original Occupants
Who Moved Out?
The original home owners did not stay long in the neighborhood. As was
seen in the turnover data, two-thirds of the original owners had moved by the
end of the first decade. Transiency, according to the literature of the time
(Henderson 1953, p. 29), was a major problem in the new suburbs, as well as
a precursor to the growth of slums. Families in whicli the head of household
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was promoted or transferred, and families that just outgrew the house were
quick to move on.
There does not appear to be a distinct occupational bias among the
households who left earliest, within the first five years. Table 6 gives the
occupational status of the original owners that moved away within five years,
and of the second owners who replaced them. Unfortunately, it was impossible
to trace the occupations of most of these early movers. It is all too likely
that transiency of this sort was a self-selecting process more prevalent
among upwardly-mobile, white-collar workers, rather than a random process.
While it is not possible to draw conclusions about those who left, those who
became the second owners within the first five years were split between pre-
dominantly clerical persons and salespersonnel in Richfield, and predominantly
skilled craftsmen and foremen in St. Louis Park.
White-
collar 1
White-
collar 2
Moved Out Moved In
St. Louis Park Richfield St. Louis Park Richfield
2 1 3 5
1 0 6 8
White-
collar 1 3
Blue-
collar 2 1
Other 0
Unknown 15 .
3
13
1 3
3 0
Table 6. Resident Turnover by Occupational Class, 1951-1956.
Social Change: 1950-1976
By 1960 the two neighborhoods had nearly equal distributions of their
workforce among the different occupational classes, both weighted fairly
heavily toward the professional and managerial occupations. After 1960, this
sector of the workforce grew even larger in the Richfield neighborhood, while
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it declined in St. Louis Park (figure 24). In the latter, the slack was tak-
en up by a growing population of retired persons--who comprise nearly 100
percent of the "other" category--and a slight increase in the unskilled blue-
collar sector. Still, the percentage of the workforce in professional and
managerial jobs in both the St. Louis Park and Richfield samples in 1976 is
above the average for the Twin Cities SMSA (Abler et. al. 1976, p. 165).
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Figure 24. Composition of the workforce, 1950-1976.
The increase in the number of retired persons in the neighborhood indi-
cates a more diverse group of residents in terms of their family status. In
1951, there was one retired person in the St. Louis Park sample; by 1976
there were ten. The data on the ages of children living in the neighborhood,
which have been used as an indicator of life-cycle stage, supports this con—
clusion. Table 7 shows that, over the twenty-five years, not only has the
distribution of children over the age spectrum changed--becoming more evenly
distributed over a wider range--but the number of children living in the
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Families with Ages of Children
no children 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15+ Number Average
Original
owners
St. Louis Park 15 9 13 6 8 3 3 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 48 2.8
Richfield 8 9 3 3 2 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 2.3
1960
St. Louis Park 27 10 7 15 12 21 10 15 13 12 9 8 8 5 9 180 7.0
Richfield 6 12 4 11 9 2 5 4 5 10 3 4 3 5 4 87 7.0
1970
St. Louis Park 9 9 6 5 3 5 4 2 8 7 3 8 1 2 28 100 9.5
Richfield 5 2 8 2 0 5 6 3 4 4 2 6 3 2 18 72 9.6
1976
St. Louis Park 50 0 3 2 4 3 2 3 1 5 4 2 5 3 3 39 79 13.0
Richfield 15 2 1 1 5 1 1 3 2 6 1 1 3 6 2 19 54 11.7
Table 7. Family status of occupants.
neighborhood has waxed and waned reaching a peak in 1960 and declining since
then. The average age of children has steadily increased. Of the households
who have no children, a growing number are families whose children have grown
and left home. These are intermingled with the young families who have no
children yet, and with households where there are children of various ages,
making a diverse and heterogeneous neighborhood.
The source of this diversity is an aging population of long-term resi-
dents; it is not brought about by a change in the characteristics of new
residents. In fact, it is evident from table 8 that the characteristics of
new occupants have changed hardly at all over twenty-five years. Those fami-
lies moving into the neighborhood in the 1970s have young children or no
children. There are fewer children living in the two neighborhoods now than
at any time during their history. This is caused by both an increasing num-
ber of older households whose children have left home, and a large number of
new households, be they young or old, who have no children.
On the basis of this evidence, one may conclude that the postwar "start-
er" houses have not lost their appeal to families at the beginning of their
lifecycle. Individual units are found to house a single family at different
stages of its lifecycle, as well as different families at the same stage of
their lifecycles. In these two particular samples the passage of time has
had the effect of bringing together both young families at the beginning of
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their career and older households at- the peak or even in the decline of their
career, where before there had been only young families.
STRUCTURAL DATA
The data collected on structural modifications to the houses were found
to be totally inadequate for any rigorous analysis. Building permits are not
required for changes to the interior of the house, which means the attic or
basement space could be finished without showing up in the data. Even modi-
fications that do require a permit--such as adding a room or a porch--are of-
ten overlooked, filing for the permit appears to be a self-selecting process
where certain individuals continue to go through the proper steps for any
changes made to the house, while other individuals will continually avoid the
whole process of obtaining a permit. Inspection of a few houses led to the
discovery of additional rooms, finished basements, and porches where the data
did not show any.
Typical changes in the postwar houses have included the addition of a
garage and finishing of the attic or basement expansion space. Garages were
usually the first improvement to be made. Basement expansion space was often
finished as a recreation room or additional bedroom. The amount of usable
living space was greatly increased by the addition of dormers in either the
front or back, or sometimes both front and back (figure 25) of the attic.
Families with Ages of Children
no children 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15+ Number Average
1951-1960
St. Louis Park 36 39 11 19 10 8 4 4 3 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 116 3.7
Richfield 10 26 9 8 6 5 2 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 64 3.2
1961-1970
St. Louis Park 45 29 16 9 10 6 7 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 8 96 4.5
Richfield 9 14 7 9 4 6 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 3 56 4.4
1971-1976
St. Louis Park 26 4 3 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 2.5
Richfield 3 4 3 2 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 3.8
Table 8. Family status of new owners, 1951-1976.
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Figure 25. Living space in the attic is expanded by adding dormers.
POSTWAR HOUSES IN TODAY'S HOUSING MARKET
A final aspect of the postwar housing boom to be considered is the role
played by the large existing stock of GI houses in the housing market today.
Old houses tend to filter down in the housing market as new and better hous-
ing is built. Filtering is also caused by obsolescence (Grigsby 1963,
p. 100). In comparison to their original position relative to the housing
market, postwar houses have become obsolete in three ways: 1) Locationally,
the postwar residential tracts are no longer on the urban fringe, and so they
don't carry the semi-rural connotation of a fringe location. In fact, inner-
ring suburbs are already perceived as less desirable and almost part of the
city (Strauss 1961, p. 248). 2) Technologically, the postwar houses are out
of date. They are no longer "clean, fresh, full of modern gadgets" (Clawson
1971, p. 45). 3) In style, the postwar house is definitely dated. Although
Lowry (1960) argues that style obsolescence is of minor importance in the
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housing market, he may not have had the postwar starter home in mind when he
did so. Cracker-box houses were not a popular style as much as they were a
necessity, and one which the housing market has outgrown.
Despite the filtering process, postwar houses have maintained a fairly
stable position in the housing market. Houses which sold for $8,000 to
$9,000 when new in 1951 sell today for $35,000 to $45,000, depending on their
location and condition. There are some isolated cases where postwar houses
carry a price tag as high as $100,000.*
The postwar house must compete with new housing in the same price range.
The median sales price for new housing in the Twin Cities in 1976 was around
$50,000. This means that postwar houses are competing on the market with
new moderate-cost housing, housing sold for slightly less than the average
*personal communication with local builder Adolph Fine.
Figure 26. Typical new moderately-priced house in 1976.
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sales price. What type of new housing was available in the moderate price
range in 1976? Much of the new development around the Twin Cities was condo-
miniums and townhouses, with some scattered development of single-family
homes. New developments are located almost exclusively beyond the ring of
first-tier suburbs.
In the $35,000-$45,000 range, the home buyer could buy a condominium or
townhouse with 1,400 square feet of living space, two or three bedrooms, two-
car garage, and appliance package included. In the same price range, one
could buy a single-family rambler or split-level home with 850-1100 square
feet, and again with two or three bedrooms, double garage, and some appli-
ances (figure 26). With so much more offered by the new house in the same
price range, one wonders how the existing postwar unit manages to compete.
Yet, demand is great enough for the postwar houses to keep vacancy rates low.
The postwar units offer two advantages over new units: 1) their location,
though obsolete in terms of being on the urban fringe, is an advantage to
households who dislike or cannot afford a longer commuting distance to work in
the central city; 2) purchasing an existing unit often carries an advantage
of assuming the mortgage of the previous owner, which could cut financing
costs drastically.
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CONCLUSION
Certain qualms about the postwar residential tracts have been set at
ease by the passage of time. For one thing, they have not become slums.
Those who feared they would, based their speculations on the mistaken assump-
tion that bad housing leads to poor people. The postwar neighborhoods have,
rather, been occupied by a socio-economic class capable of and interested in
maintaining them. In fact, the only sociological change that has occurred in
the neighborhoods has been a broadening of the range of residents that are
typically found there, providing a mixture of old and young families. This
diversification has removed the aura of homogeneity that was once so dreaded
among suburban communities. Finally, the effect of postwar house building
techniques on everything that has followed in the housing industry is so per-
vasive that it is impossible to discern where postwar house building ended
and modern house building began. It is no longer shocking to find home build-
ers producing several hundred homes per year with only a handful of variations
in the floor plan or facade.
59
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abler, Ronald and Adams, John S. 1976. A Comparative Atlas of America's 
Great Cities: Twenty Metropolitan Regions. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota.
Abler, Ronald, Adams, John S., and Borchert, John R. 1976. "The Twin Cities
of St. Paul and Minneapolis": In Contemporary Metropolitan America, v. 3,
ed. J.S. Adams, pp. 355-423. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
Administrator of Veterans Affairs. 1960. Annual Report 1959. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Architectural Forum. 1949. March: 8.
 . 1949. Economy House. March: 14-5.
 . 1949. The Cape Cod Cottage, part 2. March: 100-6.
.1949. The Builder's House. April: 81.
Berger, Bennett. 1968. Working Class Suburb. Berkeley: University of
California.
Borchert,. John R. 1961. The Twin Cities Urbanized Area: Past, Present,
Future. Geographical Review. 51: 47-70.
City of Minneapolis. 1943. Department of Inspections Annual Report.
City of Minneapolis. 1959. City Planning Commission. The Fifties and 
Minneapolis Housing Construction Trends, Publ. #114, Housing Series No. 2.
Clawson, Marion. 1971. Suburban Land Conversion in the United States.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
60
Federal Housing Administration. 1947 and 1950. Annual Report. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Fortune. 1949. Business Roundup. August: 12.
 . 1952. Levitt's Progress. October: 155.
 . 1953. The Lush New Suburban Market. November: 128.
Gans, Herbert. 1967. The Levittowners. New York: Vintage.
 . 1968. People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solu-
tions. New York: Basic Books.
Grigsby, William. 1963. Housing Markets and Public Policy. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania.
Gruenberg, Sidonie Matsner. 1955. The Challenge of the New Suburbs.
Marriage and Family Living. 17: 133-7.
Henderson, Harry. 1953. The Mass Produced Suburbs, Part 1. Harpers.
207: (November): 25-32.
House and Home. 1952. Cheaper Houses or Better Values? July: 67.
 . 1952. An Open Letter to Young Architects. October.
Housing and Home Finance Agency. . 1950. A Summary of the Evolution of 
Housing Activities in the Federal Government. Washington, D.C.
. 1952. Housing Activities of the Federal Government. Reprinted
from September 1951 issue of American Builder.
61
Keats, John. 1956. The Crack in the Picture Window. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Ktsanes, Thomas and Reissman, Leonard. 1959. Suburbia--New Homes for Old
Values. Social Problems. 7 (3): 187-95.
Lawry, Ira. 1960. Filtering and Housing Standards: A Conceptual Analysis.
Land Economics. 36: 362-70.
Maisel, Sherman. 1953. Housebuilding in Transition. Berkeley: University
of California.
Minneapolis Star. 1976. But for a Little House. December 2: 5C.
Minneapolis Tribune. 1951. Report Shows Huge Growth of Suburbs.
January 1: 11.
. .1951. Housing Project Opens in Richfield. June 24: 7E.
. 1952. Building Outlook for 1952. February 17: 2F.
. 1952. Freedom and Housing. July 30: 6.
. 1952. State Home Building Trails Rest of the Nation.
December 9: 15.
Moses, Robert. 1950. Build and Be Damned. Atlantic Monthly. 186 (Decem-
ber): 40-2.
Mumford, Lewis. 1961. The City in History. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World.
Smith, Wallace. 1970. Housing: the Social and Economic Elements. Berke-
ley: University of California.
62
Strauss, Anselm. 1961. Images of the American City. New York: Free Press
of Glencoe.
Sun Newspapers Inc. 1965-1977. Sun Directories. Edina, Mn.
R.L. Polk and Co. 1956-1976. Suburban Polk Directories. St. Paul, Mn.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1949, 1952, 1956, 1962, 1967, 1972. County and 
City Data Book. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
. 1950, 1960, 1970. U.S. Census of Population and Housing,
Minneapolis-St. Paul SMSA. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
. 1971. 1970 Census of Population, Classification of Industries 
and Occupations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
. 1975. Historical Statistics of the U.S.--Colonial Times to 
1970. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Veterans Administration. 1959. Annual Report. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Warner, Sam Bass, Jr. 1972. The Urban Wilderness. New York: Harper and
Row.
82nd Congress, 2nd Session. 1952. Veteran's Loan Guaranty Program. House
Report #2501. 5 (September 11)-: 8.
63
Postwar Housing in National & Local
Perspective
Copy 2
Postwar Housing in National & Local
Perspective
Copy 2
